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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1997 TERM
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
and
Mary Murphy
CWRU Law School, Class of 1998
This article summarizes many of the criminal law decisions decided by the United States Supreme Court during
the last term.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Traffic Stops & Consent Searches
In Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996), the Supreme
Court reversed an Ohio SupremaGourt decision, which had
required that the officer clearly state when a citizen, validly
detained for a traffic offense, was "legally free to go."
Robinette had been clocked at 69 mph in a 45 mph zone.
After the officer issued a warning and returned Robinette's
license, the officer asked if he was carrying any illegal contraband in the car. Robinette answered no and consented
to a car search. The officer found marijuana and a pill,
which turned out to be MDMA. The officer was on drug interdiction patrol at the time and routinely requested permission to search cars he stopped for traffic violations.
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not require that a lawfully detained defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent be deemed a
voluntary consent. "[T]he subjective intentions of the officer
did not make the continued detention of [the] respondent
illegal under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 420.
The Supreme Court held that the "touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," which is "measured
in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." ld. at 419. The Court has "eschewed bright line
rules, instead emphasizing the fact specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry." ld. The Court pointed out that it
had previously rejected similar per se rules, and it would be
"unrealistic to require officers to always inform detainees
that they are free to go before a consent to search may be
deemed voluntary." ld.
Traffic Stops & Passengers
In Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S.Ct. 882 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
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434 U.S. 106 (1977), which states that an officer, as a matter of course, may order a driver of a lawfully stopped car to
get out, extends to passengers as well.
Wilson was a passenger in a car lawfully detained for
speeding. Before the car pulled over, the officer observed
the pa~senge~s behaving oddly. After the car was stopped,
the off1cer not1ced that Wilson was sweating and appeared
"nervous." When the officer asked Wilson to exit the car
crack cocaine fell out of the car. Wilson was arrested, a~d
h~ moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that ordering
h1m out of the car was an unreasonable seizure.
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that an officer may
order "persons" out of an automobile lawfully detained.
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security" and "that reasonableness 'depends
on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' 117 S.Ct. at 884-85 (citing 434 U.S.
at 108-09). In Mimms, the Court held that the public interest
in the safety of the police officer made it reasonable to ask a
driver to step out of the car. The Court concluded that the
risk to the officer's safety was even higher when there were
passengers in the car. The additional number of people increased the sources of harm to the officer. On the personal
liberty side of the balance, the Court conceded that a passenger's personal liberty interest is higher than a driver's
because the driver had at least committed a traffic violation.
The Court went on to conclude, however, that as a practical
matter the passenger was already detained by virtue of the
officer pulling over the car and therefore the additional intrusion was minimal.

Knock & Announce Rule
In Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the
knock and announce requirement for felony drug offenses.

Chief Public Defender James A. Draper
Telephone (216) 443-7223
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office,
100 Lakeside Place, 1200 W. 3rd Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender.
Copyright© 1997 Paul Giannelli ·
, ·
0 ,~~Jiw··

'I

~I
,I

I

1

,1
fl·'

; !
'.

,; __. 1

, :· .·'
:

·. ', , ':!
:: ·
.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does
not permit the blanket exception.
In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Supreme
Court held that "the Fourth Amendment incorporates the
common law requirement that police officers entering a
dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity
and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same
time, ... [the Court] recognized that the 'flexible require-.
ment of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a
rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law
enforcement interests' and left 'to the lower courts the task
of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable .... "' 117 S.Ct at 1418 (citing
514 U.S. at 934-36).
In Richards, the Supreme Court conceded that the knock
and announce rule can give way under certain circumstances, such as when there is a threat of physical violence
or a threat that evidence will be destroyed. However, the
fact that felony drug investigations frequently involve these
-two threats does not justify a per se exception. The Court
had two concerns. First, the exception contains "considerable overgeneralization" and not every drug investigation
will pose these risks. ld. at 1421. The Court pointed out
that sometimes the only people at the scene are individuals
not involved in the criminal activity or the evidence sought is
not the type that is easily destroyed. The second concern is
that an exception in one category can easily be applied to
others. The Court pointed out that armed bank robbery also
frequently involves the same threats of violence towards police and the destruction of evidence. "[T]he fact that felony
drug investigations may frequently present circumstances
warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral
scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular
case." ld.
Although the Court rejected Wisconsin's per se rule, the
Court concluded that in Richards' case the no-knock entry
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Richards had
slammed the door after he had cracked it open and saw a
police officer in uniform. The Supreme Court ruled that the
police officers were justified in breaking the door in and
were reasonable in their fear that Richards might hurt them
or destroy evidence.

and seizures, and it is settled that drug tests are "searches."
"This restraint on government conduct generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion. Searches conducted without grounds for
suspicion of particular individuals have been upheld, however, in 'certain limited circumstances."' 117 S.Ct. at 1298. In
order to qualify as a "limited circumstance" there must be a
showing that the test serves a "special need" other than the
"ordinary needs of law enforcement." ld. at 1299. After
there is a showing of special need, the Court will "balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it [was] impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context."' ld. (citing Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 656).
The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that
the testing method prescribed by the statute was relatively
noninvasive. The Court then went on to answer the question of whether the certification requirement was warranted
by a "special need." The Court's "precedents establish that
the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial - important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress
the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." ld. at 1303. The Court concluded that
Georgia failed to show a special need.
First, the Court pointed out that the program was not well
designed to identify candidates as drug abusers nor was it
an effective means of deterrence. The candidate could abstain from drug use in the period prior to the test since he
knew when the test would be. The Court did not understand why ordinary law enforcement methods were not sufficient to detect addicted individuals, especially since the officials would be in the public limelight. Georgia relied most
heavily on the Court's decision in Von Raab, which allowed
for drug testing of Customs Service officers prior to promotion or transfer even in the absence of individualized suspicion. There also was no evidence in Von Raab of a particular problem among employees like there had been among
the railroad workers in Skinner and the student athletes in
Vernonia. Georgia claimed that the reasons for drug testing
were closely aligned with the reasons given in Von Raab.
In Von Raab, the Court held that the government had a
compelling interest to ensure that the "front line interdiction
personnel" were not only fit but of "impeachable integrity
and judgment." ld. at 1304. Because of their work, customs officials are constantly exposed to organized crime
and susceptible to bribery and blackmail. These reasons
are similar to the ones that the State used as justification for
enacting the statute. The Court pointed out that there was a
"telling difference" between Von Raab's and Georgia's drug
testing provision. It is not "'feasible to subject employees
[required to carry firearms or concerned with interdiction of
controlled substances] and their work product to the kind of
day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office
environments."' ld. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674).
Candidates in public office are subject to heightened day-today scrutiny, and therefore drug abuse is detectable absent
a drug testing program.
The Court concluded that Georgia, despite the reasons
given, was merely interested in projecting an image of the
State's commitment to the struggle against drug abuse.
Georgia had no evidence of a particular problem among its
officials, and the officials covered by the statute did not perform high risk safety sensitive tasks like the railroad employ-

Drug Testing
In Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (1997), the Supreme
Court held that Georgia's requirement that candidates for
designated state offices certify that they passed a urinalysis
drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination did
not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches. The drug test had
been challenged by Libertarian Party nominees. They
claimed that the test violated their rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit
had decided that the Georgia law was constitutional, relying
on three cases sustaining drug testing programs. Venonica
School Dist., 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995), involved
random drug testing of athletes who participated in interscholastic sports. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), upheld drug testing for railway
employees involved in train accidents and those who violated certain safety rules. National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), allowed testing of customs employees.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
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ees. The certification did not immediately aid any interdiction effort as it did with the customs agents in Von Raab. In
short, the need was only symbolic and not "special" and
was not sufficient to override the privacy interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment.

ney had petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that the
summary contempt violated due process. The Ninth Circuit
held the summary contempt invalid, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
Watson's client was on trial for killing a gang member
and was being tried with other codefendants. On three separate occasions, the counsel of different codefendants
raised in open court the issue of the punishment the defendants might receive if found guilty. On each occasion, the
trial judge ·stated that possible punishment was not a subject that should be discussed in open court. Ms. Watson,
though not included in the bench conferences per se, was
within six feet of the side bar conferences. She was also
present in court when the trial judge stated that the subject
would not be explored because it was prejudicial. The
judge felt that since the victim was a gang member the jury
would refuse to convict if they knew what a harsh penalty
could be imposed on someone killing such an unworthy person.
Ms. Watson was questioning her client when she
broached the forbidden subject. The prosecutor asked that
she be admonished and she was. Immediately following
the exchange, she asked the defendant if he knew he was
facing life without parole. The judge held her in contempt.
The judge gave Watson two opportunities to justify her actions. She stated that she thought her questions were relevant, and she did not think the questions were covered by
his previous ruling. The judge found that her questions had
permanently prejudiced the jury in favor of her client. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that her due process rights
were violated because she did not have notice and the trial
judge could not have known without a hearing if Watson's
conduct was willful.
The Supreme Court stressed that a court needs summary contempt to preserve order in the courtroom. The Court
held that the "the summary contempt exception to the normal due process requirements, such as a hearing, counsel,
and the opportunity to call witnesses, 'includes only charges
of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge,
which disturbs the court's business, where all the essential
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court,
are actually observed by the court, and where immediate
punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the
court's authority before the public."' ld. at 2362 (quoting In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,275 (1948)). The Court of Appeals
had required a finding of repeated violations by a contemnor
that was sufficiently disruptive to threaten the dignity of the
court. The Supreme Court disagreed and pointed out that
summary contempt convictions had been upheld after a single violation. The Court of Appeals had "glossed over'' the
state court findings that the comments had permanently
prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court held that this finding by the trial court, plus the assessment of Watson's clear
defiance of a court order, was all that was needed to support a summary contempt conviction. Due process imposes
limits but "states must have latitude in determining what
conduct so infects orderly judicial proceedings that contempt is permitted." ld. at 2363. While the Court would not
explore the limits of the states' latitude, the Court held that
Watson's conduct fell well within the range of contemptuous
conduct.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Sentence Enhancement
In United States v. Watts, 117 S.Ct. 633 (1997), two separate cases were filed in a single petition for certiorari. In
both cases, the sentencing courts enhanced the defendants' sentences because of conduct for which they had
been acquitted and, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit had reversed. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court's decision conflicted with the clear implications of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Supreme Court's prior decisions,
particularly Witte v. United states, 115 S.Ct 2199 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 3661 states that "[n]o limitation shall be
placed on information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." Before the
Sentencing Guidelines, it was "well established" that the
sentencing judge could consider facts related to other
charges even if the defendant had been acquitted of those
charges. This discretion did not change with the Sentencing
Guidelines. Quoting Witte, the Court held that "[relevant
conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances
that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior
to the Guidelines' enactment." The Court pointed to Section
181.4 of the Guidelines, which mirrors the language in§
3661. Section 151.3 also contains "sweeping language" as
to what a sentencing judge may consider. The commentary
to that section states that a judge may consider "conduct not
formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction." The sentencing court may consider "all acts and
omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
The Supreme Court commented that the Court of
Appeals position was also based on an erroneous view of
double jeopardy jurisprudence. "[S]entencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he
was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the crime of
conviction." ld. at 636 (quoting Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2207-08).
The Court also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the "preclusive effect of an acquittal, when it asserted that a jury 'rejects' some facts when it returns a verdict of not guilty." Id. at 637. There are different standards
of proof that govern at trial and at sentencing. Acquittal
does not necessarily mean that a defendant is innocent but
that the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of
the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court noted that
an acquittal is not a finding of fact and does not preclude
the Government from relitigating the fact under a lower burden of proof. The Guidelines state that the appropriate
standard at sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence.
CONTEMPT: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
In Pounders v. Watson, 117 S.Ct. 2359 (1997), a criminal
defense attorney, Penelope Watson, had been subject to
summary contempt by the trial court for asking questions on
a subject that had already been forbidden by the judge both
in open court and at several bench conferences. The attar-

DEFENSE OFFERS TO STIPULATE
In Old Chief v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 644 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its
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discretion by failing to accept the defendant's offer to stipulate. Old Chiefwas charged with possession of a firearm by
anyone with a prior felony conviction. Old Chief's previous
conviction was assault causing serious bodily harm. To
prove that a defendant has a previous conviction, the prosecution can introduce a record of judgment. To prevent the
jury from hearing the nature of the previous offense, Old
Chief offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a
felony. He feared undue prejudice if the jury heard the nature of his prior offense, and he claimed that his offer to stipulate rendered evidence of the name and nature of his prior
offense inadmissible under Federal Evidence Rule 403.
Rule 403 provides that otherwise relevant evidence may be
excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's probative value.
The prosecution refused to stipulate and introduced the
judgment. The jury found Old Chief guilty. The Ninth Circuit
ruled that the government was entitled to prove the prior
conviction element using probative evidence and that a stipulation has no place in the Federal Rules of Evidence balancing act.
The Supreme Court held that Old Chief's argument that
the name of his prior conviction as contained in the documentary evidence was irrelevant under FRE 401 and therefore inadmissible under FRE 402, was erroneous. "[E]videntiary relevance under Rule 401 [is not] affected by availability of alternative proofs of the element, [such as stipulation], to which it went ...." ld at 649. "Exclusion must rest
not on the ground that the other evidence rendered it 'irrelevant,' but on its character as unfairly prejudicial, cumulative
or the like, its relevance notwithstanding." ld. at 650.
The Supreme Court saw the principal issue as the scope
of a trial judge's discretion under FRE 403. The Court described unfair prejudice as the "capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt
on a ground different from proof specific of the offense
charged." ld. The danger in this case was that the jury, on
hearing the nature of Old Chief's previous conviction, would
assume that he had a propensity for this type of behavior
and judge him as acting in the present situation in conformity with this type of character. FRE 404(b) addresses
propensity reasoning directly by making evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts inadmissible to prove conformity
with character.
Evidence of a prior conviction can have a legitimate purpose as well as an illegitimate one. It can be introduced, as
the state did here, to prove an element of a crime. But
when a single piece of evidence has two purposes, the evidence is subject to analysis under FRE 403, and its balancing between unfair prejudice and probative value. The prosecution is entitled to prove its case by admissible evidence
of its own choice, and a "defendant's Rule 403 objection offering to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the
Government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all
the circumstances surrounding the offense." ld. at 651.
While conceding that the prosecution's burden needs "evidentiary depth," the Supreme Court held that this need had
no application when the point at issue was the defendant's
legal status. Congress did not distinguish between what
types of felonies a person charged under § 922(g)(1) had to
be convicted of, only that he had been convicted. The prosecution lost nothing in accepting the stipulation, while the
Government's use of the judgment with the name of the offense did risk unfair prejudice by the jury. The Court reversed, concluding that the "risk of unfair prejudice did sub-

stantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the
record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to
admit the record when an admission was available."
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
4
In United States v. Hyde, 117 S.Ct. 1630 (1997), Hyde
had plead guilty to several fraud counts pursuant to a plea
agreement that involved dismissal of four other charges.
The District Court accepted the plea after an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Hyde was pleading guilty
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The District Court
deferred accepting the plea agreement until after the completion of the pre_sentence report. The defendant attempted
to withdraw his plea after its acceptance but before the
court accepted the plea agreement. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the defendant had "an absolute righf' to withdraw his
guilty plea before the District Court accepted the plea
agreement. The Supreme Court held that the Court of
Appeals' ruling not only contradicted the language of
Federal Criminal Rules 11 and 32(e) but also would "degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a move in a game of chess." ld. at 1634.
Criminal Rule 32(e) provides that if a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is made before sentence is imposed, the court
may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows
"any fair and just reason." Rule 11, the principal provision
dealing with guilty pleas and plea agreements, does not
preclude a district court from accepting a guilty plea without
first accepting the plea agreement. Also, Rule 11 (e) divides
plea agreements into three types based on what the
Government agrees to do. Hyde's plea was a type A agreed
ment, where the Government agrees to move for dismissal
of other charges. Rule 11 (e)(2) explicitly states that, as to a
type A agreement, the court may accept, reject, or defer acceptance/rejection of the plea agreement until after the presentence report. If the court rejects the plea, then Rule
11 (e)(4) becomes significant. This section states that after
rejection the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw his plea for any reason without complying with
Rule 32(e)'s ''fair and just requirement." If a defendant may
withdraw for any reason prior to acceptance of the plea
agreement, then the rejection of an agreement as laid out in
Rule 11 (e)(4), with its explicit opportunity to withdraw, would
have no significance.
The Supreme Court also concluded that it would be difficult to see any purpose for Rule 32(e), and its requirement
to show a ''fair and just reason" for withdrawing a plea if the
Court of Appeals' holding were correct. Under the Court of
Appeals' interpretation, there would be little time during
which the "fair and just reason" standard would apply. It
would be applicable only between the time the plea agreement was accepted and sentence was imposed and both
acceptance and sentencing usually took place at the same
time. The Supreme Court saw "no indication in the Rules to
suggest that Rule 32(e) can be eviscerated in this manner,
and the Court of Appeals did not point to one." ld. at 1635.
I

SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997), the
~
Supreme Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act in face of challenges on substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds. The Court
held that the Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied
the substantive due process requirements for civil commit-
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ment and because the Act did not establish criminal pro~
ceedings, ·challenges on double jeopardy and ex post facto
grounds were precluded.
Hendricks was the first to be committed under the
'<"ansas procedures for civil involuntary commitment of perJns who, due to a "mental abnormality or personality disorder" are likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence." The legislature passed the Act to deal with repeat
sex offenders because it believed that the civil commitment
procedures were inadequate to cope with this subclass of
mentally ill persons. Because the likelihood of repeated
acts is high and the prognosis for rehabilitation in general
and particularly in a prison setting i$ poor, the legislature established a special civil commitment procedure for sexually
violent predators. A sexually violent predator is defined as
"any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." The
Act defined "mental abnormality'' as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offense in a degree constituting such person as a menace
to the health and safety of society."
The prosecutor files the petition for involuntary commitment. The court determines if probable cause exists to support a finding that the soon-to-be-released prisoner is a sexually violent predator. If the court makes such a determination, the individual is evaluated and then a trial is held. If
the prosecutor proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual is a sexually violent predator, he is committed for
control and treatment until he is no longer a danger to soci:ty. The Act has a number of procedural safeguards. The
Durden of proof is on the State and indigents are provided
counsel and an examination by a mental health expert. A
person may present and cross-examine witnesses and review documentary evidence. Once confined, an individual
can, at any time, file a release petition or the State may file
one if he is cured. The individual is afforded an annual review, with a court determining beyond a reasonable doubt
that the individual still qualifies for confinement.
Hendricks was a repeat sex offender, and he admitted at
his commitment hearing that he was not cured. The jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he qualified as a sexually violent predator, and he was ordered committed.
The Supreme Court ruled that a finding of "mental abnormality" satisfied due process requirements. "Although freedom from physical restraint 'has always been at the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from governmental action,' ... that liberty interest is not absolute."
ld. at 2079 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992)). In certain narrow circumstances, the courts have
upheld involuntary civil commitment when a person's behavior threatens the public welfare. The.Act requires more
than a finding of dangerousness, which standing alone is
not sufficient grounds for confinement. The Act also requires a "mental abnormality or personality disorder'' with
substantial evidence that the individual will commit the acts
again if not confined. The Court found that the Act's re'luirements served to adequately limit confinement to those
Nho were dangerous beyond their own control. The Court
did not accept Hendricks' argument that mental abnormality
did not mean the same thing as mental illness. The Court
noted that psychiatrists and even the Court itself has used
different expressions to mean the same thing. Although

substantive due process requires a finding of "mental illness," the Court has never required States to adopt any
"particular nomenclature" when drafting civil commitment
statutes. The Court held that Hendricks met the criteria relating to a person's inability to control his dangerousness
set forth in this act and other valid civil commitment
statutes.
On Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims,
the Court held that without the establishment of a criminal
proceeding by the statute and confinement that amounts to
punishment, these two prohibitions do not come into play.
The Court concluded that the commitment was civil in nature. The Court did not accept the civil label as dispositive
but rather looked at the intent of the confinement. Criminal
confinement is meant to punish or serve as a deterrence.
This type of confinement was meant to do neither. The
Court remarked that Hendricks' focus on the confinement's
potentially indefinite duration was misplaced since the Act
tied duration to the stated purpose of confinement. Once
cured, a person was free to leave. Confinement without
some type of review was, at the most, for one year. If the
State wishes to hold a person longer, the court must once
again determine·beyond a reasonable doubt that confinement is warranted.
Hendricks also argued that because there is no known
treatment for his illness, the involuntary confinement really
amounts to punitive treatment. The Court stated that the
fact that a legislature's overriding concern is to keep the offender from the public and the goal of rehabilitation is incidental because treatment is almost nonexistent does not, in
itself, turn the confinement into punishment. Hendricks'
double jeopardy claim also failed because the Act did not
impose punishment.

PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997), the
Supreme Court considered a state statute making it a felony
to assist a suicide. Four physicians, three terminally ill patients, and a nonprofit organization had sought declaratory
judgment that the statute was unconstitutional because it
burdened a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the right to assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty. The Court
also concluded that the Washington statute was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.
The opinion provides a lengthy analysis of the Nation's
history, legal traditions, and practices. Almost every State
makes it a crime to assist suicide. For over 700 years the
Anglo American common law tradition has been to punish
suicide and the assistance in suicide. Suicide has been referred to as "self murder'' and although the Nation has abolished some of its more harsh common law penalties, there
has not been a widespread acceptance of suicide or the assistance in suicide. More importantly, the prohibitions
against assisting suicide have never contained exceptions
for those near death, hopelessly diseased, or unduly suffering. In recent years, because of improved medical technology, the assisted suicide prohibitions have been reexamined. The public focus has been on how best to protect
one's dignity and independence in end of life decision making. While there has been acceptance of provisions for refusal of life sustaining medical treatment, most people have
rejected any move toward assisted suicide.
"The Due Process Cause guarantees more than fair
5

process, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the
absence of physical restraint" Id. at 2:267 (quoting Collins
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)). Not only are the
freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights protected, but also the
right to marry, to have children, to direct the upbringing of
one's children, to enjoy marital privacy, to use contraception, to enjoy bodily integrity, and to have an abortion. But
the Court has "'always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended."' ld. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at
125).
The Court's "established method of sub9tantive-dueprocess analysis has two primary features: First, ... [the
Court has] regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."' ld. at 2268. Next, the Court has required a
"careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. ld. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)). The Court concluded that the asserted right, assisted suicide, had no place in the Nation's tradition and to
embrace this right would be to reverse centuries of legal
doctrine and practice. Although the Court had upheld the
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition in Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), this right
was not grounded in abstract concepts of personal autonomy extending to a "right to die" but rather in long standing
concepts and common-law rules that forced medication was
battery and one had a right to refuse medical treatment. In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U;S. 1 (1973), the Court held that although protected liberties are referred to as "personal autonomy'' rights, it does
not necessarily follow that all important, personal and intimate decisions are constitutionally protected.
The Court found that the Washington statute easily complied with the constitutional requirement that a prohibition be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The
government could legitimately seek to preserve human life
and prohibit intentional killing. Suicide was viewed as a serious public health problem especially among the more vulnerable in society like the young, the elderly, the poor, the
disabled and those suffering from mental disorders and depression caused by untreated pain. It is necessary to protect these vulnerable groups from psychological and financial pressures to end their lives and thus avoid a slippery
slope towards voluntary or even involuntary euthanasia.
The Government has an interest in protecting the integrity of
the medical profession. The Court concluded that these interests were "unquestionably important and legitimate, and
Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably
related to their promotion and protection." 117 S.Ct. at 2275.

ing similarly situated patients differently.
The Supreme Court recognized that the Equal Protection
Clause, while requiring that States must treat like cases
alike, does not require the States to treat unlike cases accordingly. Since the statute does not involve a fundamental
right or a suspect class, it is entitled to a strong presumption
of validity. The Court found that New York was treating all
competent patients evenhandedly. All could refuse medical
treatment, and no one was permitted to be .assisted in the
act of suicide. The Court of Appeals saw the class as terminally ill patients, all similar except one class was allowed to
"hasten death" and one was not. In contrast, the Supreme
Court saw a cjistinction between the class of persons refusing life sustaining treatment and those asking for physician
assisted suicide. The Court said that this distinction was ra.,.
tiona! and supported by most States and the A.M.A.
The Court concluded that the purpose of allowing a patient to refuse treatment was not to allow the patient to "hasten death" but rather to respect his wishes concerning futile
treatment. A person refusing treatment may not have the intent to die but a person asking for help in committing suicide
must necessarily have that intent. The Court held that if a
classification is rationally based it was of no constitutional
concern that particular groups (such as those terminally ill
who are not on life support) receive uneven treatment. The
Supreme Court also found that the legislative classification
in the statute's ban on assisted suicide while permitting refusal of treatment was rationally related to valid State interests such as preserving life, preventing suicide, physician
integrity, and protection of vulnerable persons.
CONCURRENT SENTENCING
In United States v. Gonzales, 117 S.Ct. 1032, (1997),
three respondents had been convicted under state laws for
drug trafficking and the use of firearms during drug trafficking crimes. They had begun to serve their state sentences
when they were also convicted on various similar federal
drug charges and, in particular, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which
covers the use of firearms during drug crimes. The District
Court had concluded that the portion of their federal sentences attributable to their drug convictions could run concurrently with their state sentences, but the plain language
of§ 924(c) required that the remaining five year sentence,
attributable to the use of firearms, would run consecutively.
Section 924(c) states that "the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with
any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for
the ... drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used
or carried." (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit vacated the firearms sentences and
held that the sentences could run concurrently, finding section 942(c)'s language ambiguous. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if the phrase "any other term
of imprisonment" means what it says or only applies to federal sentences. The Court held that the word "any" had an
expansive meaning and the statute did not refer only to federal sentences. The Court pointed out that the legislature
had expressly limited "any crime" to federal crimes and had
not chosen to place a similar restrictive modifier when it
spoke of "any sentence." The Supreme Court found nothing 4
remarkable or ambiguous about Congress' choice of words '
in the statute. The Court held that a federal court may not
direct that a prison sentence under§ 924(c) run concurrent- .
ly with a state imposed sentence because the plain meaning of the statute makes it clear that it "shall not" do so.

Equal Protection
In Vacca v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997), the Supreme
Court determined that New York's prohibition on physician
assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
In New York it is a crime to intentionally cause or aid another to commit or attempt suicide. A patient may, however,
refuse even lifesaving medical treatment, and the physician
who honors that request is free from punishment.
Physicians sued the State's Attorney General, claiming that
honoring a request for refusal of treatment and physician
assisted suicide were essentially the same thing and since
the State allowed one and not the other the State was treat-
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PAROLE REVOCATION
In Young v. Harper, 117 S.Ct. 1148 (1997), the Supreme
Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Super-:vision Program was sufficiently similar to parole to require
the same due process protections set forth in Morrissey v.
'rewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Oklahoma has two programs under which an inmate can
be conditionally released before the end of his sentence,
parole and preparole. Preparole becomes an option when
the prisons exceed a certain percentage over capacity.
Harper, who had served 15 years of a life sentence for two
murders, was simultaneously recommended for parole and
released under the preparole program. While the Pardon
and Parole Board decides who will be released under the
preparole program, the Governor has the final say on parole. After Harper had been out for five months, the
Governor denied his petition for parole and Harper was ordered back to prison.
The essence of parole is the early conditioned release
from prison before the end of one's sentence, and the nature of the interest of the parolee is continued liberty. The
Court found that the preparole program served the same
purpose and involved the same liberty interest. The petitioners tried to distinguish preparole from parole, but the
Court found these differences to be merely "phantom differences" or too insignificant to place removal from the preparole program beyond due process procedural protections.
The Court saw three real differences in the program: (1) the.
Pardon and Parole Board decides who is eligible for the
preparole program and the Governor has the final say on
parole, (2) escaped preparolees are treated as if they escaped from prison and escaped parolees are subject only to
1arole revocation, and (3) preparolees can not leave the
sate for any reason and parolees may leave at the discretion of the parole officer. The Court concluded that these
differences only set the preparole program apart from the
specific terms of parole in Oklahoma, but not apart from the
more general class of parole identified in Morrissey, and
therefore removal from either program required due process

cates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are
'one determinant of petitioner's] prison term ... and ... [the
petitioner's] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed."' ld. at 898 (quoting Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981 )). The Court distinguished a prior
case, California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S.Ct.
1597 (1995). "Unlike the California amendment at issue in
Morales, the 1992 Florida statute did more than simply remove a mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a class of prisoners whose early release was unlikely; rather it made ineligible for early release a class of
prisoners who were previously eligible - including some,
like petitioner, who had actually been released." 117 S.Ct. at
898.
RETROACTIVITY
In Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct. 1517 (1997), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Court's decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079
(1992), announced a "new rule" as defined in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and therefore could not be applied retroactively to petitioner's federal habeas proceeding.
Lambrix was given a death sentence in Florida, a "weighing state," and sought post conviction relief. Florida has a
three part sentencing procedure. First, the jury renders an
a?visory opinion by weighing statutorily specific aggravating
Circumstances against any mitigating factors. Second, the
trial court does an independent weighing of the aggravating
and mitigating factors and enters a sentence of life imprisonment or death. Third, the Florida Supreme Court reviews
all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death.
Lambrix contended that the jury instruction concerning the
"especially heinous and atrocious" aggravating circumstance failed to provide sufficient guidance to limit the jury's
discretion and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.
The State had contended that Lambrix was not entitled to
relief because the trial court had properly used a narrower
aggravator.
In Espinosa, decided after Lambrix's conviction, the
Supreme Court held that if "a 'weighing state' requires the
sentencing trial judge to give deference to a jury's advisory
recommendation, neither the judge nor the jury is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances." 117 S.Ct. at 1524. Lambrix was seeking to apply
this principle retroactively, and the State contended that the
holding in Espinosa is a "new rule" under Teague and could
not be relied on in a federal habeas proceeding.
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that "'new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to
those cases which have become final before the new rules
are announced."' ld. (citing 489 U.S. at 310). To apply
Teague, a federal court must: (1) determine the date on
which conviction became final, (2) survey the legal landscape as it then existed and determine whether a state
court, considering the defendant's claim at the time the conviction became final, would have felt compelled by existing
precedent to conclude that the rule was required by the
Constitution, and (3) if the announced rule is considered a
new rule, determine whether the relief sought falls within
two narrow exceptions.
The Supreme Court concluded that the holding in
Espinosa was not dictated by then existing precedent and
therefore was a "new rule" as defined by Teague and not to
apply retroactively. Espinosa did not rely on any controlling

pro~ection.

EX POST FACTO
In Lynce v Mathis, 117 S.Ct. 891 (1997), the Supreme
Court considered an ex post facto claim arising from the
retroactive cancellation of a prisoner's provisional early release credits, which had been awarded to alleviate prison
overcrowding. In 1983, the Florida Legislature established
the early release program, and Lynce was released in 1992.
Subsequently, the state Attorney General interpreted a 1992
statute as canceling retroactively credits for those who had
committed murder or attempted murder. Because Lynce fell
into this category, he was rearrested and returned to prison.
The Supreme Court ruled that this action violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. The Clause is violated when the state
increases punishment of an offense after it has been committed. The prohibition applies when the law is (1) retrospective and (2) disadvantages the offender. The Court
stated that the motivation of the legislature was irrelevant.
For the Court, the critical issue was the effect of the legisla·on -here, the cancellation of 1 ,869 days of accumulated
provisional credits and whether the cancellation lengthened
the petitioner's incarceration. "[R]etroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern the initial sentencing, impli-
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the time of Lambrix's conviction, was persuaded that a "reasonable jurist considering Lambrix's sentence in 1986 could
have reached a conclusion different from the one Espinosa
announced in 1992." ld. at 1527.

precedent and only cited one case using a "ct.", which
snows that the supporting authority is dictum or analogy and
ndtControlling:Thetnree cases tliat Lambrix relied on to
define the legal landscape were distinguished by the Court.
All three cases dealt with impermissibly vague aggravators
and supported the proposition that aggravators must be narrowed to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death sentence.
But, a sentencing jury's consideration of a vague aggravator
can be cured on appeal and the Court was more concerned, in these cases, by the failure of the appellate court
to cure the error and not necessarily concerned with the
jury's consideration of a vague aggravator standing alone.
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the legal landscape at

/
Even though Espinosa is a new rule, the petitioner's
claim could fall under two exceptions to the non-retroactivity~
doctrine. The Supreme Court held that neither exception
applied. Espinosa does not decriminalize a class of conduct nor prohibits the imposition of the death sentence on a
particular class of individuals, nor does Espinosa stand tor a
watershed rule of criminal procedure that implicates the
criminal proceeding's fundamental fairness and accuracy.
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